, not only meant the military victory of the later, but also the imposition of a certain conception of Ethiopian statehood.
As a "byproduct of the Ethiopian student movement" (ESM) (Gebru, 2009, p. 82) the TPLF had forged its nationalist discourse in terms of the "national oppression thesis", derived from the Stalinist theory of nationalities, as opposed to other competing interpretations of Ethiopia's imperial period, i.e. the "nation-building thesis" (defended by the Ethiopian Democratic Union, EDU), the "colonial thesis" (notably defended by the Oromo Liberation Front), or the "multinational The chauvinist ruling classes adhere to the principle of "Itiopiawinnet" (Ethiopianness) which kills identity based on nationality. So they do not follow the principle of forming a nation-wide organization through a union of nationality-based organizations. They aspire to form a dominant multi-nation organization composed of individuals from various nationalities and ethnic organizations that have betrayed the causes of their people and bowed to these chauvinists. Secessionists and narrow nationalist organizations do not want the fulilment of the peoples' common interests. So, they, too, do not want to form a nation-wide organization together with other nationality-based organizations 5 .
As Clapham notes, the EPRDF "(…) therefore conceived Ethiopia in terms very diferent from those of previous regimes Clapham, b, p. . Imperial symbols and heroes were in fact denigrated and new ones were made founding myths. For instance, the imperial lag was presented as a mere piece of cloth 2 The EPRDF is a coalition formed under the auspice of the TPLF at the end of the . It took its deinitive form at the beginning of the 1990s and comprises four political parties: the TPLF, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Front.
3 See Merera (2003) . On the origins of the TPLF, see Young (1997) ; and for the view of a former founding member of the Front, see Aregawi (2009) . 4 Article 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The preceding derg regime had already started to organize a federal Ethiopian state under the Stalinist theory (creation of the Institute for Ethiopian Nationalities, and the national Shengo which oicially represented these nationalities according to the 1989 constitution). But in practice, the derg continued to defend a centralized, violent and unitary conception of the Ethiopian nationhood (Clapham, 1989; Dias, 2008, pp. 175-176). and King of Kings Menilek II (r. 1889 II (r. -1913 , until then celebrated as a national hero and symbol of resistance against European colonialism, was condemned for his "genocidal campaigns" within its Ethiopian empire. The EPRDF thus revisited Ethiopian history from 1991 onward, considered the Aksum Empire as the historical core of Ethiopia and dated the modern Ethiopian state back to Menilek II's conquests in the nineteenth century (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 58; Gascon, 2009; Clapham, 2002a) .
However, less than a decade later, the batle of "dwa was celebrated again as a national victory against colonialism, and giant pictures of the former (Dias, 2008, p. 208) . Clearly, the 1998-2000 context of the war reactivated the resort to a national historiography inherited from the preceding regimes. On the one hand, as Tronvoll brilliantly demonstrated, "the discourses on identity in Ethiopia changed radically with the outbreak of the war.
Suddenly, Ethiopianness rose like a phoenix from the revolutionary ashes, positioning itself at the centre of the political discourse on identity" (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 58) . And on the other, in the aftermath of war "the emphasis on diversity and decentralization (…) was increasingly substituted by the focus on unity and on a revived and more salient centralizing trend" (Dias, 2008, p. 208) . Assefa Fisseha went even further in describing the EPRDF's nationalist "shift" after the war, and 6 Since the irst Flag day in , the national Ethiopian lag has been celebrated every year, on diferent dates.
7 On the war, its causes and its aftermaths, see among others Tekeste & Tronvoll (2000) ; Jacquin-Berdal & Plaut (2005); Dias (2008) .
8 I shall deine Ethiopianness as a nationalist discourse based on a conception of the Ethiopian national identity as transcending people's particular identities, inherited from the imperial times (Bureau, 1987) and aiming at legitimizing a "great" or "utopian Ethiopia" (Gascon, 1995) . more precisely after the 2001 split within the , when he noted that "(…) the tone of discussion seems to have shifted toward the dangers of 'narrow nationalism' and the 'manipulation of ethnic identity for parochial purposes'" (Assefa, 2006, p. 147) .
But this way of considering the pre-war and the post-war periods as coinciding with two radically diverging and opposing discourses (ethnic-based before the war, and Pan-Ethiopian after the war) of the EPRDF leadership seems questionable when we focus on TPLF's discourses before the war, and even before 1991. In fact, except a very initial period during which the Tigrayan Front claimed independence for Tigray (the famous 1976 Manifesto), the TPLF fast reoriented its claims for a unitary and democratic Ethiopia within which the "nationalities"
would be freed from oppression (Gebru, 2009, p. 86) , and harshly condemned "narrow nationalism" (EPRDF, 1993) . Further, in the early 1990s, Ethiopianness appeared as second-zone identity but still compatible with "primordial" ones. In Meles Zenawi's own terms: "Ethiopianness" was then considered "a right, not an obligation" (Meles Zenawi, 1994) . And after the 1998-2000 war, the annual celebrations of NNPs (festival of the NNPs) have shown that Ethiopianness has not replaced "primordial" identities in EPRDF's nationalism.
Thus, the role played by the war must be tempered, for EPRDF's centralized practice of power and the resilience of Ethiopianness in the early 1990s indicate that "ethnic federalism" was not such a radical turn as it could initially appear (Barnes & Osmond, 2005; Abbink, 2009) . Beyond the formal discourses and ideological views inherited from the ESM, "ethnic federalism" has to be considered above all as a concrete political strategy in order to deal with diversity within the country on the one hand, and to deal with -or exclude -political opponents on the other. In fact, the great challenge facing the EPRDF at the beginning of the 1990s consisted in transforming an inherited empire into a "new" state. That meant proposing a regime capable of absorbing the inherent tension of (empire or) state-building resulting from the simultaneous process of "integrating and diferentiating diferent groups "urbank & Cooper, , p. . The question raised by Burbank & Cooper is still very relevant in the Ethiopian case, in the imperial or current periods: "After the rapid expansion of the empire, how to build a lasting power?" (Burbank & Cooper, 2009, p. 15) . Concerning political opponents, ethnic-federalism appeared to be an eicient way of excluding every group (and sometimes former enemies fought during the struggle, like 9 The war exacerbated internal tensions irst within the TPLF and then in the other parties of the coalition. Meles Zenawi eventually imposed his views and TPLF "strong nationalist" members were expelled (like Gebru Asrate, former president of Tigray Region). See Medhane & Young (2003) .
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EDU or EPRP former members) defending another conception of the Ethiopian nationhood or ethnic representation (Vaughan, 1994) . Ethiopianness and ethnicfederalism shall not be considered incompatible nationalisms that would have replaced each other alternatively, but rather two levels of EPRDF's nationalism whose articulations have been determined by speciic circumstances. Tronvoll argued that "Ethiopian nationalism today (…) comes in the plural" in the war aftermaths (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 207 From rebellion to government: playing with a multifaceted nationalism 1 -1
Following the fall of the derg regime and the coming of the TPLF/EPRDF to power, one can observe that the nation-building strategy as elaborated by this front stressed the "primordial" belonging to "Nations, Nationalities and Peoples" as the basis of Ethiopians' identity. Nevertheless, Ethiopianness soon reappeared in EPRDF's discourses in the early 1990s. This multifaceted nationalism is to be explained by particular circumstances and also by the inheritance of a certain Oromo and Tigrayan martyrs were on the contrary celebrated as victims of these imperial expansions: the commemoration of the batle of Chelenqo which allowed Menilek to control the eastern commercial road to Harar gave tribute to "Oromo martyrs". The "massacre of Annolee" during which, according to the new oicial sources, Oromo ighters were then said to have lost their lives 11 , was also commemorated every year from 1992 on, and the violent repression of Tigrayan uprising in 1943 (Weyane) by Haile Selassie's regime after the Second World War were denounced for being "expansionist", "violent" and "tyrannical"
12
. In fact, Haile Selassie's and the derg regimes were both presented as imperial criminals, heirs of Menilek's policies: 10 The batle occurred in the night and morning of the st of March, 1896. It opposed the Italian army and its locally recruited soldiers (askari) going south from their colony in Eritrea (about 10 000 men) to the huge Ethiopian imperial army led by Menilek II and its generals (Ras) coming from all the Ethiopian empire (about 100 000 men). The Italian army was eventually defeated. See Maimire (1997); McClellan (1996, p. 63 ); see also Getachew & Paulos (2005) .
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Menilek's genocidal campaign against the Oromos has not so far been exposed One can atribute this relative deconstruction of Ethiopianness by the new TPLF/EPRDF leadership and its reconstruction on the basis of NNPs to three main factors. First, the conception of the Ethiopian nation of the new leadership remained strongly inluenced by their ideological background, i.e. the "national oppression thesis" inherited from the 1960s and 1970s (Merera, 2003) . New regimes need renewed myths and mythologies in order to stress the contrast with past regimes and build their power and legitimacy
16
. It is about demarcating themselves from the previous fallen regimes against which they fought. Second, one can say 13 "Menilek's genocidal campaign", The Ethiopian Herald, 5 January 1992.
14 "President Meles Zenawi replies to questions posed by journalists", The Ethiopian Herald, 23, 24, and 25 September . These ideas were conirmed in an interview of Meles Zenawi by Donald Levine published the same month. See Levine (1992) .
15 "President Meles Zenawi replies to questions posed by journalists", The Ethiopian Herald, 23, 24, 25 September 1992. 16 The derg also defended the idea of "unity in diversity" and promoted, during the very last years of the regime, a federal reconiguration of Ethiopian state based on the recognition of the diferent nations. "ut although it created the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities in in order to list the diferent nationalities that had to be represented in the national Assembly (Shengo from on, the groups so identiied had no real power and the Shengo remained an appendix of the derg. As Clapham writes, in post-1991, "the Stalinist theory of nationalities had life only after death" (Clapham, 2002b, p. 25) .
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• , -that TPLF/EPRDF's leadership had to satisfy other national groups (Oromos, Afar, etc. with whom they had been ighting during the struggle and who were now expecting a reward for such alliances (autonomy, independence). Finally, the relatively peaceful regional context did not necessitate a broad Ethiopian mobilisation against an "external" enemy. National "enemies" were at the moment just those who opposed such a deconstruction of Ethiopianness within Ethiopia
17
. In fact, this new strategy of state-and nation-building implied an ethnic interpretation of all Ethiopian conlicts, as the new leadership ideologically considered economic, social and political marginalization of NNPs (here synonymous of ethnic, even if this term is barely used by the former guerrillas) as the main source of conlicts under previous regimes. For them, the eradication of any national "oppression" through "multinational federalism" and the rethinking of the notions of state and nation in terms of NNPs had to respect Ethiopian diversities and preserve the country from any future conlict
18
.
Ethiopianness: a right, not an obligation Meles Zenawi, 1 4
But the idea of Ethiopianness, while strongly rejected in internal EPRDF papers, was not that radically condemned publicly, and even progressively increased again from the middle of the 1990s. In fact, it would be excessive to conclude from these irst observations that Ethiopianness purely and simply disappeared as from 1991 in EPRDF's discourses. Indeed, the Ethiopia-scale national discourse was not totally abandoned at the beginning of the 1990s, although it then appeared like a "second class identity", beyond the "Rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples". It is also worth noting the ambiguity created by the coexistence of a dual identity after : while the domestic citizenship was deined in terms of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, it had to coexist with a remaining international Ethiopian identity (Dias, 2008, pp. 144-152) 19 .
During the transitional period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , rather than a complete rejection of Ethiopianness, one could observe a complex articulation of these two conceptions of Ethiopian nation. While primordial identities got a legal and constitutional status (Transition Charter and then the Art. 39 of the 1995 Constitution), Ethiopianness 17 Opposing such a new vision of the Ethiopian nation and defending an Ethiopia-broad identity, the All-Amhara People's Organization was thus tendentiously accused of sponsoring "war" and was erased from the political scene.
18 See "No alternative to peace and democracy", The Ethiopian Herald, 21 January, 1992; and "President Meles briefs local, foreign journalists on current Ethiopia situation", The Ethiopian Herald, 2 February 1993. On the consequences of such an externally deined and imposed identity in terms of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, see Abbink (1998 This may partly explain why the ethnic discourse was tempered from the middle of the 1990s onward, in order to maintain the still fragile unity of the territory and to optimise the economic potential in a country that had to be rebuilt.
A second event may have played in important role in the preservation of Ethiopianness: the conlict in neighbouring Somalia. "fter the fall of Siyad "arre in , the diferent groups in power could not reach any agreement for a peaceful and inclusive transition. This led to the "collapse" of the young Somali state.
Within that period, the Ethiopian government press presented this conlict as emerging from inter-clan tensions and resulting in a state of "chaos" and "anarchy . This vision of the Somali conlict probably scared the Ethiopian leadership which had the task of stabilizing the country after more than ifteen years of a cruel civil war. Ethnic tensions may have carried a strong potential for violence very hard to deal with. Ethiopianness then appeared very useful as a common
Ethiopian sense of belonging able to deal with "unity in diversity".
The 1994 massacres in Rwanda could also explain the inertia of Ethiopianness as a third and external event. The genocide in Rwanda conirmed the danger in institutionalizing ethnicity and the politicization and manipulation of the later when deined from above . In fact, this episode of Rwanda contemporary history was very present in Ethiopia as the government sent a contingent to participate in the United Nations peacekeeping mission there. Even recently, two months before the general elections in Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi justiied the banning of two radio stations (Voice of America and Deutsche Welle) by accusing them of inciting hatred, the Prime minister explicitly comparing the stations to Radio Mille Collines, and underscoring the important role played by the radio in the genocide (Bach, 2011, p. 488 represent an important step from Tigray nationalism to Ethiopian nationalism (Aregawi, 2009, pp. 176-185; Young, 1997, pp. 138-139) . As Tronvoll noted, once the Tigray region was liberated from the derg armies at the end of the 1980s, this decision to continue the struggle until Addis Ababa had two major implications:
First, the Front had to readjust its ideological platform so that the revolution of Tigrayanness and political autonomy could also include an Ethiopian solution to the problem of other suppressed 'nationalities' […] And, secondly, it had to establish alliances with other ethnic fronts outside Tigray in order to carry on the military struggle on 'foreign' ethnic soil (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 55 ).
This evolution is actually not surprising. The Tigrayan leadership had condemned Menilek II who was accused of having "abandoned" parts of Tigray to the Italians (Hamassien and the Northern part of the Mereb river) after the battle of Adwa (1896). Haile Selassie was equally condemned for the repressions of any atempt of Tigrayan's resistance against his state-building enterprise cf. the Weyane uprising in 1943; Gebru, 1996) . But the Tigrayan rebels and elites considered Tigray itself not only as part of the Ethiopian state, but as its historical core (Medhane, 1999, pp. 1-64; Gascon, 2006, p. 75) . In fact, Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889),
former King of Kings of Ethiopia, just before Menilek II, originated from Tigray.
In 1872, he was crowned in Axum, the religious and former centre of the empire, hence reinventing a tradition abandoned since the crowning of Yassou IV in the same place in 1693. Yohannes IV thus conirmed the moving of the Ethiopian political, religious and symbolic state "centre" to Tigray at the end of the XIX th century, anchoring the Solomonic ascendency of its authority (Ancel, 2006; Henze, , p. .
He thus deinitely connected what was becoming the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church to state-building in order to legitimize his power. Ras Alula, the head of Yohannes' army and defender of Tigray against both external and
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internal threats, did not get any oicial title as a hero at the Ethiopian level, but has remained a major hero in contemporary Tigrayan memories (Erlich, 1996) .
Besides, his statue in Asmara was destroyed just after EPLF took power (1991) (Medhane, 1999) .
Tigray was seen to stand at the core of Ethiopia's long-term history, a frontier region between two state-and nation-building processes, the emerging Eritrean nation-state in the North and the Ethiopian empire in the South. For instance, the TPLF atachment clearly appears through the names given to military ofensives during the struggle against the derg. While the later launched the Operation Adwa" in 1988 and the "Operations Aksum I" and "Aksum II" in 1988 and 1989 against Eritrean and Tigrayan Fronts (Gebru, 2009) (Young, 1996) . Within a few weeks, a boundary clash in contested territories fast became a large scale war in which both countries lost in total about 100, 000 soldiers (Tekeste & Tronvoll, 2000; Jacquin-Berdal & Plaut, 2004; Dias, 2008) . From the beginning of the conlict, the EPRDF elites clearly adopted a renewed discourse of Ethiopianness using symbols and myths used by the previous regimes and relatively undermined since . This tendency was reairmed after the general elections in which opposition groups defending a "real Ethiopianness" obtained some successes. That eventually led to a readjusted nation-building strategy in which Ethiopianness and NNPs have been more equally balanced.
The 1998-2000 war: reactivating a strong Ethiopianness
Tronvoll has demonstrated the impact of the 1998-2000 war on "the formation and conceptualisation of identities in Ethiopia", and the (re)construction of enemies' and allies' images in its aftermaths (Tronvoll, 2009) . I would like to focus here on the perspective of the Ethiopian government as nation-builder, and on
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the way some national symbols, rejected by TPLF/EPRDF rulers at the beginning of the 1990s, were then re-appropriated and used by these post-1991 Ethiopian rulers in order to ight against a new Eritrean enemy.
Empires-, states-and nation-building is marked by some pivotal events referring to diferent levels of nationalism, their re activations depending on particular contexts. The liberation struggle and the ight against imperial and derg's nationalism gave sense to a nationalism based on Nations, Nationalities and Peoples after 1991. The war against Eritrea meant resorting to broader federating symbols and pivotal events stressing the "unity" and solidarity of Ethiopian peoples. That implied the increasing use of another dimension of nationalism at state level, inherited from the imperial period -which, once again, had not disappeared since . These diferent nationalisms do not switch places with each other, but became articulated so that the Pan-national repertories embraced those who consider themselves as Tigrayan, Oromo, Kembata and Ethiopian, or those who felt they belonged to both ethnic and Ethiopian identities.
In this context, the batle of "dwa appeared a very powerful pivotal event for the Ethiopian leadership in 1998-2000. In fact, it symbolized the union of Ethiopian peoples in their resistance against external enemies. In the 1990s, the commemorations of the batle of "dwa were occasions to celebrate Ethiopian
NNPs. Then, in 1996, while Ethiopianness was quietly reactivated as noted above, a great celebration was organised to mark the centenary of Adwa victory against
Italian aggressors, showing a growing interest for such an imperial event
26
. The outbreak of the -war deinitely rehabilitated the symbol.
The most illustrative fact of the reappropriation of Adwa by the TPLF/EPRDF is undoubtedly the 1 st of March 1999, the date on which one of the most important Ethiopian ofensives against Eritrean troops in the disputed area of "adme was launched (Operation Sunset . One could read on the irst page of the governmental newspaper the following day: "It is propitious that the Badme victory was scored just as Ethiopians were preparing to observe the 103 rd anniversary of the "atle of "dwa today
27
. The next day, the 3 rd of March 1999, the same newspaper published a special issue on the two events. "t the top of the irst page, one could read: "dwa Victory Day Colourfully Celebrated , and at the botom of the same 26 See "Adwa centenary worthier than commemorations of Normandy landings, V-Day", and "We are all children of Adwa (A. Triulzi)", The Ethiopian Herald, 27 February, 1996 . See also the proceedings of the conference given at this occasion (Ahmad & Richard, 1998) . For a historical and general view on the event, see Getachew & Paulos (2005) . 27 "Operation Sunset culminates in success", The Ethiopian Herald, 2 nd March, 1999.
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page: "adme Victory -" Heroic Spirit Kindling . This Double Victory! was celebrated during the whole of the following week 28 .
The 1998-2000 war did not only prove the strength of Ethiopianness, but also its usefulness for the Ethiopian political elite in place. The conlict against Eritrea incited the Ethiopian government to resort to the "colonial" memory, presenting the Eritrean regime as the heir of the Italian invaders. The TPLF/EPRDF endorsed the role of defender of the Ethiopian state, as did the preceding regimes against European countries. The use of the Adwa memory further revealed the inertia of imperial history and its symbolism, showing how the same set of mythologies could be used in diferent ways, in diferent contexts and for diferent political objectives (Girardet, 1986, pp. 9-24) . Badme, since then, has been laden with such a strong mythology that the Ethiopian government could not allow to lose the place -even though it has been situated in Eritrea according to the In 1991, the relative change of national identity and the subsequent revision of Ethiopia's history at the beginning of the 1990s appeared more controversial than the implementation of the federal system itself (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 58) . In fact, multinational federalism was strongly condemned by observers for being the denial of Ethiopianist feeling supposedly born in "dwa, puting at risk national unity (Worku, 1993; Aberra, 1995) and eventually leading to the "country's disintegration" (Maimire, 2005, p. 253; Getachew & Paulos, 2005) .
Very early, political movements defending Ethiopia's unity expressed their concern about the "ethnic divisions" Ethiopia would be facing (Levine, 1992, Since childhood, we have been told that we are Ethiopians. Being Ethiopian is the only thing we know. But those forces allergic to this idea have left no stone unturned to incite inter-ethnic conlict in our country. "ll these atempts have failed.
This was because the Ethiopian people have never fought wars along ethnic lines.
They showed great maturity in the face of investigations which could have possibly led to great sufering elsewhere … . "t times, I fear that a situation like that of
Lebanon or Yugoslavia could develop in Ethiopia (…)
31
30 "AAPO leaders speak out", Ethiopian Review, March 1993, pp. 15-16. 31 Ibid., p. 16.
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Parties defending the Ethiopian state's and nation's unity, and criticising multinational federalism have not disappeared. Quite logically, they just reappeared and increased after 2000, in the post-war context. In fact, opponents defending a unitary Ethiopia found in the war the occasion to legitimize their thesis and prove they were "right" at the beginning of the 1990s when they warned of imminent new conlicts, for which multinational federalism was accused of being responsible. This resurgence of a Pan-Ethiopian nationalist discourse clearly emerged at the occasion of the 2005 regional and federal elections and got a new dimension.
The May/August 2005 general elections can be considered as the freest and fairest since the fall of the derg. For the irst time in Ethiopian history, debates between diferent and opposed parties were publicised and aired on TV and
Radio, thus giving opposition groups the occasion to publicly broadcast their views and programs (Schmidt, 2005; Abbink, 2006; Gilkes, 2007 . Many Ethiopians that I met these last years remember the feeling of freedom they felt for the irst time when they peacefully gathered at Meskel Square and contested EPRDF's power.
But the greatest hope also turned out to be the greatest deception. The CUD won 137 of the 138 seats of Addis Ababa city Council. It thus had the majority in the regional and federal level (CUD won 109 seats in the House of People's Representatives), which marked a turning point in Ethiopian political history (the opponents had been almost absent in the lower House till then). 172 seats were won by the whole opposition, 372 remaining to the EPRDF and its ailiated parties. This was a big surprise for the EPRDF which did not expect losing that much, particularly in the rural regions. But in the aftermath of the ballot, the CUD leadership and other opposition groups contested the electoral fairness and people began to demonstrate in the streets. 32 Formed in October 2004, the main components of the CUD were: the All-Ethiopian Unity Party, the United Ethiopia Democratic Party-Medhin, the Ethiopian Democratic League, and Rainbow Ethiopia (see Abbink, 2006; ICG, 2009) . The United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF, or Hibrät) led by the Addis Ababa University Professors Merera Gudina (Oromo National Congress) and Beyene Petros (Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party), represents the second most important coalition challenging EPRDF's power in 2005. Contrary to the CUD, the UEDF did not reject multinational federalism, but condemned what they considered authoritarian practices and EPRDF's monopolization of power. UEDF is composed of Ethiopian-based parties (mainly in the Southern regions) as well as exiled groups (in the United States). The coalition strongly criticizes EPRDF for the issue of the 1998-2000 war, considering that Ethiopia should have rejected the 2000 Algiers Agreement (ending the war) and (re)integrate the "lost" region.
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• , - : "Ethnic federalism, we think, will erode togetherness and unity, which in turn leads to identity complex. We are not underestimating ethnic groups at all, no ever. We are only against ethnic federalism" . CUD's nationalism being an obvious inheritance of imperial Ethiopianness, the EPRDF had few options but to (re)appropriate and reinvent the national set of mythologies which is a complex mix between myths inherited from imperial, derg and current regimes. Through this discursive strategy, the EPRDF aimed at federating Ethiopians which partly explains why diferent levels of nationalism are so clearly superimposed in the present day Ethiopia. 37 Lidetu Ayalew, Six-party debate, Ethiopian Television, "Democracy, election and multipartism in Ethiopia", February . These abstracts are unoicial translations from "mharic. 42 Many opposition parties do not reject federalism or ethnic federalism. This was for instance the case of the coalition EUDP (Hibrät) in 2005, or the new coalition Medrek ("Forum") in 2010 whose main leaders were professors Merera Gudina and Beyene Petros. These groups criticize EPRDF's policies and "authoritarian practices", but not "ethnic federalism" per se.
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Conclusion
Anchored in the "national oppression thesis" inherited from the Ethiopian student movement, the EPRDF leadership has been defending a conception of Ethiopian society structured "from below" and rooted in ascribed primordial identities. That representation determined the new discourses aiming at supporting nation-and state-building in post-1991 Ethiopia (Merera, 2006; Vaughan, 2011) . Nevertheless, the radical deconstruction of Ethiopianness expressed to exclude competing political groups was fast reactivated. As Tronvoll writes, the oicially sanctioned nationalism designed and expressed by the EPRDF government was not powerful enough to neutralise other competing nationalist discourses, creating a complex and sometimes contradictory context of nationalist expressions (Tronvoll, 2009, p. 207 ).
The developments above conirm that the -war is essential but not suicient to explain the complex reconigurations, adaptations and reinventions of Ethiopian nationalisms since 1991 (and before). The Ethiopian case very interestingly illustrates Girardet's idea that large "mythological sets" or "constellations of myths remain despite the diferent ways their inherent symbols, images or heroes can be used and reinvented (Girardet, 1986, pp. 12-20) . Rather than a research of a "real past" or historical "truth", myths and mythologies thus have to be studied above all for what they tell about the present.
These articulations of Pan-Ethiopianness and primordial identities have to be understood out of the main challenge of state-and nation-builders consisting in transforming an empire into a "modern" state. That process has implied the need to reinvent the Ethiopian nation in order to ind a way to federate diferent groups in a coherent national project, but also in order to control them (Burbank & Cooper, 2008, pp. 500-501) . The EPRDF had to deal with the tension between integration and diferentiation rooted in Menilek's conquests from the end of the 19 th century. The current polymorphous nationalism (like all nationalisms may be) tends to resolve the "persistent dilemma of empires": how to incorporate different populations in a coherent political entity by maintaining, at the same time, distinctions and hierarchies on which domination is based. The Ethiopian case proves how thin the line remains between fallen empires and the states which replace them (Bertrand, 2006; Brown, 2011) , and how problematic the challenge remains.
